The statute requires that all places where workers in the construction trades are employed must be “so constructed, equipped, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, health and safety of all persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.”
Stripped of the formal language: owners, contractors, and employers must provide a reasonably safe worksite. This is a codification of common-law negligence — the same duty that exists in nearly every American jurisdiction.
The differences from common-law negligence in other states are at the margins:
§200 cases generally fall into one of two analytical branches:
When the injury was caused by a dangerous condition on the worksite — debris in a walkway, an unguarded opening, a slippery surface, an unsafe scaffold left in place — the plaintiff must generally prove the defendant had notice of the condition. Notice can be:
If the plaintiff can prove notice, §200 imposes liability on the owner and contractor.
When the injury was caused by the way the work was being performed — not a discrete dangerous condition, but the methods, equipment, or sequence of operations — the plaintiff must generally prove the defendant exercised actual supervision and control over the means and methods of the work.
This is a higher bar. General authority to enforce safety standards is not enough; the defendant must have had specific control over how the particular work was being done. General contractors with overall site control can often be held liable; property owners who hired a competent GC and stayed out of the work usually cannot.
The categorization matters. The defense will sometimes argue your case is a means-and-methods case (where they can defeat liability by showing they didn’t control the work) when the plaintiff sees it as a notice case (where the defendant clearly should have known about the condition).
§200 is the primary theory — rather than a backup to §240 or §241(6) — in several common situations:
§200 applies to owners, contractors, and statutory agents — but the liability standard depends on the branch of the case:
In notice cases, the owner is liable if it had notice of the condition. In means-and-methods cases, the owner is generally liable only if it actually controlled the work.
Generally have broader exposure under §200 because GCs typically have actual control over the worksite. Whether a GC controlled the specific work that caused the injury is a fact-specific analysis.
CM exposure under §200 depends on the specific contractual relationship and the actual conduct of the CM on the job. CMs at risk often have §200 exposure; pure agency CMs sometimes don’t.
Generally not §200 defendants for injuries to other subs’ workers, but can be §200 defendants for injuries to their own workers in some situations.
The defense will typically raise:
These defenses can be substantial under §200, unlike under §240 where most of them are unavailable. This is why we plead §240 and §241(6) where they apply — those statutes are stronger.
Same categories as any New York personal injury case. Comparative fault applies, so a finding of fault on the worker’s part reduces but does not eliminate the recovery.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
§200 cases turn on documentation that establishes notice or control. The OAC meeting minutes, the daily safety inspection logs, the GC’s written safety policies, the project email traffic.
A working developer reads these documents to find the moment when someone in authority became aware of a problem and didn’t act on it. Sometimes the email traffic shows it directly. Sometimes the safety meeting minutes show it. Sometimes the OSHA citation history establishes a pattern that the GC should have addressed but didn’t.
These details are how §200 cases get built.
Most cases run more than one statute concurrently. Roughly:
We plead every applicable theory.
In a typical negligence case, the defense will argue your case down with comparative-fault arguments — that you weren’t paying attention, that you took a shortcut, that you should have known better. Under §240, those arguments generally cannot defeat the claim. That is why §240 cases tend to settle higher and earlier than negligence-only construction cases.
If you were injured on a New York construction site, call us today. We will analyze your case under §240, §241(6), §200, and any other applicable theory.
